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HOW TO ALLOCATE SCARCE HEALTH
RESOURCES WITHOUT
DISCRIMINATING AGAINST PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES
TYLER M. JOHN,∗ JOSEPH MILLUM†, DAVID WASSERMAN‡
Abstract: One widely used method for allocating health care resources
involves the use of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to rank treatments in
terms of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) gained. CEA has been criticized
for discriminating against people with disabilities by valuing their lives less
than those of non-disabled people. Avoiding discrimination seems to lead to
the ’QALY trap’: we cannot value saving lives equally and still value raising
quality of life. This paper reviews existing responses to the QALY trap and
argues that all are problematic. Instead, we argue that adopting a moderate
form of prioritarianism avoids the QALY trap and disability discrimination.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In contemporary societies, limited health care budgets mean that not
all health care interventions that would be beneficial can be provided
to the people who need them. Policymakers within health care systems
must therefore set priorities for which interventions to fund. One
widely used tool for allocating health care resources involves the use of
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Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) to rank treatments. If we can assess the
benefits and costs of each intervention, we can use CEA to compare them,
and select the intervention with the most favourable cost-benefit ratio. For
example, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)
conducts technology appraisals of new treatments being considered
for the National Health Service in England and Wales. Its binding
recommendations are largely based on a cost-effectiveness threshold
(NICE 2005).
The use of CEA to set health care spending priorities has been
widely criticized. One of the most discussed criticisms is that it
unfairly discriminates against people with disabilities and chronic health
conditions. CEA assesses the benefits of health care interventions on
the basis of the quality as well as quantity of life-years they save. This
methodology seems to imply that extending the lives of people with
disabilities and chronic health conditions is less valuable than extending
the lives of those without them.1
In this essay, we review the alternatives to CEA that have been
developed in response to this criticism. We argue that the alternative
allocation schemes philosophers and health economists have proposed
all have problematic implications. Instead, we argue that adopting a
moderate form of prioritarianism is the best way to deal with the disability
discrimination concern. It provides a theoretically grounded alternative to
CEA that gives intuitively plausible verdicts for many cases and does not
invidiously discriminate against people with conditions that lower their
quality of life.
2. THE QALY TRAP
Health interventions may target both morbidity and mortality. In order
to rationally set priorities for health spending we therefore must be able
to compare the value of averting different states of illness and death.
Summary measures of health, such as quality-adjusted life years (QALYs),
provide a common measure of the value of different health states. One
straightforward way to calculate the value of a health state in terms of
QALYs is to take the health-related quality of life score of a health state and
multiply it by the duration of the health state.2 One QALY is equivalent
to a year lived in perfect health, that is, in a health state with a health-
related quality of life score of 1.0. One year spent in sub-optimal health
will have a value less than one QALY. For example, if paraplegia had
1 See, among others, Harris (1987, 1995), Ubel et al. (2000), Brock (2009), Kamm (2009), Nord
et al. (2009) and Bognar (2010).
2 In this paper we ignore other complications in the construction of QALYs, such as the use
of time-discounting, since they would complicate matters without making a difference to
our normative analysis.
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a quality score of 0.55, then one year of paraplegia would be valued at
0.55 QALYs.3 Curing paraplegia would be worth 0.45 QALYs per year.
A year of a health state that is as bad as being dead is valued at 0
QALYs.4
QALYs can be used in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to compare
the relative value of different interventions. Suppose that Yin and Sam
were each in a traffic accident. Yin suffered severe lumbar spinal torsion,
and without treatment will be paraplegic for the rest of her life. With the
proper surgery she can make a full recovery. Sam suffered damages to
the ligament in his ankle, and without treatment will suffer from ankle
instability for the rest of his life. With the proper surgery, he can make a
full recovery. Suppose that the quality of life score of paraplegia is 0.55 and
the quality of life score of ankle instability is 0.80. Yin and Sam are each
expected to live 40 years after the accident and the two surgeries cost the
same amount. Treating Yin will yield 18 QALYs, because her 40 years of
life will have a quality 0.45 units better than it otherwise would have had.
Treating Sam will yield 8 QALYs, because his 40 years of life will have a
quality 0.20 units better than it otherwise would have had.5 Because the
two interventions cost the same, if we allocate resources strictly on the
basis of CEA we should prioritize treating Yin over treating Sam when we
cannot treat both.
Many people find the results of QALY aggregation less plausible
when deciding how to allocate interventions that save people’s lives.
Suppose Valentina and Deepak both need a liver transplant and will die
without it. Other than her liver failure, Valentina is completely healthy.
If she receives the organ, her health-related quality of life will be 1.0 for
20 years, until she dies. Deepak, however, not only has a failed organ,
but is paraplegic. If he receives the organ, his health-related quality of life
will be 0.55 for 20 years, until he dies. Many people think that Valentina
and Deepak should be given equal priority, even those who agree that
someone with paraplegia normally has substantially lower quality of life
than someone who is able-bodied. Deciding the transplant on the basis of
QALYs tells us differently. If Valentina is treated, she will gain 20 QALYs,
but if Deepak is treated he will only gain 11 QALYs.6 Thus, CEA tells us
3 We are not here endorsing these values, which come from time trade-off research from
Lin et al. (2006). For a critical discussion of quality score assignments in cost-effectiveness
analysis, see sections 3.2.1 and 5.1 of this paper.
4 There might be health states that are regarded as being worse than death. Although
standard ways of constructing QALYs assume health state valuations between 0 and 1
there is no reason, in principle, why values below 0 could not be accommodated.
5 40 years × 0.45 quality = 18 QALYs; 40 years × 0.2 quality = 8 QALYs.
6 20 years × 1.0 quality = 20 QALYs; 20 years × 0.55 quality = 11 QALYs.
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to prioritize treating Valentina over treating Deepak. To many, this seems
to discriminate against Deepak on the basis of his disability.7
We might try to incorporate this belief about the equal importance of
saving people’s lives into CEA. We could assign the same value to any
year of extra life, whether that year is spent at full or sub-optimal health.
However, if a year in any health state has the same value, then this implies
that there is no value to curing chronic health conditions. Recall that, on
the original quality of life valuation of paraplegia (0.55), curing it would
provide 0.45 QALYs per year of life. This was because curing paraplegia
raised a patient’s health utility score by 0.45. But to account for the belief
about the value of life-saving, we must say that a year of a patient’s life
with paraplegia has the same value as a year of her life without paraplegia
(1.0 QALY). Thus, a treatment that cured a patient’s paraplegia would
provide no additional value. Because summary measures of health like
QALYs combine both quality and quantity of life in a single unit, they
cannot simultaneously accommodate our intuitions about raising quality
of life and saving lives. If we want to value interventions that raise
people’s quality of life, we are forced to give less value to saving the lives
of those with lower quality of life. On the other hand, if we want to give
equal value to saving the lives of those with lower quality of life, we are
forced to give no value to raising people’s quality of life. As Ubel et al.
conclude: ’the QALY model has us trapped’ (2000: 895).
The ’QALY trap’ illuminates a broader challenge with reconciling
common views about the importance of curing chronic conditions and
valuing the lives of people with disabilities. As we just noted, many
people endorse the principle of Equal Value to Saving Lives, according to
which it is equally valuable to save the life of someone with low quality
of life as someone with high quality.8 Most also endorse Value to Reducing
Morbidity: all else equal, it is better to save someone’s life and cure her
disability than save her life but leave her disabled. By transitivity of the
betterness relation, it follows from these two principles that we should
endorse Unequal Value for Equal Outcomes: it is better to save the life of
someone with a chronic health condition who will then be healthy, than
to save the life of someone already healthy who will then be healthy.
This seems counter-intuitive. After all, the outcomes of the treatments
are identical: in either case, we save the life of someone who goes on to
live in full health. If the outcomes are the same, they should be assigned
the same value. We know of no philosophers who defend Unequal Value
for Equal Outcomes. No matter how we proceed, it appears that we must
7 A survey from Ubel et al. (1999) provides evidence that many people find this
discriminatory.
8 Throughout, we assume that the quality of life of the people we discuss is such as to make
continued life worth living.
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accept some prima facie counter-intuitive view. We must reject Equal Value
to Saving Lives, Value to ReducingMorbidity, or the transitivity of betterness,
or we must accept Unequal Value for Equal Outcomes.
We can generalize the problem further by not limiting ourselves to
scarce health care resources, to disabilities as the source of reduced quality
of life, or to health-related quality of life. In a world of scarce resources,
policymakers must make choices about saving the lives of people with
great disparities in expected quality of life, whatever their source. And
they must make tradeoffs between saving lives and improving quality of
life, whether through health care or the provision of other resources. We
return to this point in section 4; for the moment we follow the existing
literature by focusing on disabilities as a source of reduced health-related
quality of life.
3. RESPONSES TO THE QALY TRAP
3.1. Reject Equal Value to Saving Lives
One response is to deny that saving the lives of people who will have lives
with lower levels of well-being is as valuable as saving the lives of people
who will have higher levels of well-being. Among others, this response
has been adopted by Peter Singer, and by Nick Beckstead and Toby Ord.
Singer and a group of philosophers at Monash University (Singer
et al. 1995) make a ’contractarian’ case for rejecting Equal Value to Saving
Lives. Following John Rawls, they hold that a just social arrangement
is one to which rational egoists would consent from behind a ’veil of
ignorance’, i.e. not knowing which position in society they would occupy.
They envision ’people choosing a basis for allocating health care without
knowing whether, at some point in their lives, they will be in need of
health care to prolong their lives’ or whether, if this happens, they will be
among those with high levels of well-being in their lives or those with low
levels of well-being in their lives (Singer et al. 1995: 148).9 Singer et al. argue
that these rational egoists would reject Equal Value to Saving Lives, and
therefore that so-called ’disability discrimination’ in CEA is not unjust.
Suppose that you are a rational egoist deliberating about whether
society should save the life of someone with a quality of life of 0.55 or
someone with a quality of life of 1.0, both of whom will live for the same
length of time if their lives are saved. From behind the veil of ignorance,
you do not know which you will be: you have a 50% chance of being the
person at 0.55 and a 50% chance of being the person at 1.0. This means
9 Singer describes those with low levels of well-being in their lives as having a lower ’interest
in continuing to live’. It might be argued that having a lower level of well-being does not
imply having a lower interest in continuing life. We sidestep this issue by speaking only of
’lower levels of well-being’.
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that if the person at 0.55 is saved, there is a 50% chance that you will end
up living a life at 0.55 after t, and a 50% chance that you will die at t. But
if the person at 1.0 is saved, there is a 50% chance that you will end up
living a life at 1.0 after t, and a 50% chance that you will die at t. Since it
is better for you if you have a quality of life of 1.0 than a quality of life
of 0.55, saving the person at 1.0 is the rational choice. According to Singer
et al., then, if the veil of ignorance is the correct way to determine whether
a society is just, rejecting Equal Value to Saving Lives is not unjust.10
Singer et al.’s argument faces two problems. First, its contractarian
premise is questionable: even if the veil of ignorance were an appropriate
device for selecting the basic structure of society – a debatable claim – it
might not be appropriate for priority-setting decisions within that basic
structure. We do not pursue this concern further here. Second, even if
the veil of ignorance were a good tool for assessing allocative principles,
Singer et al.’s expected utility theory of rationality is open to challenge.
Rawls himself denied the rationality of maximizing expected outcome
in choosing the basic structure of society behind a veil of ignorance.
Instead, he advocated the ’maximin’ strategy of optimizing the position
of the worst off (Rawls 1971: 152–157).11 He argued that under certain
conditions, which are present in his hypothetical choice situation, it is
rational to sacrifice some expected gains to secure the ’best worst’ outcome
(1971: 152–154).12
It is easier to see that the rational response to the choice situation
Singer et al. describe is not obvious if we recognize that the choice behind
the veil is really a choice between whole lives. For simplicity, assume that
both people whose lives could be saved are 40 years old at time t and
would live another 40 years if saved. The rational egoist must choose
whose life will be saved at t, but will live the whole life of one of the two
people. From behind the veil her choice is between: (1) a 50% chance of
10 We could also determine who will be saved on the basis of a coin toss. If we did so, there
would be a 25% chance that you would live a life with 0.55 health utility after t, a 25%
chance that you would live a life with a 1.0 health utility after t, and a 50% chance that
you would die at t. This is worse for you than if the person with a 1.0 health utility were
saved, so this is not what you would rationally choose.
11 Singer et al. discuss Rawls’ view, saying that ’there have long been good grounds for
thinking that in A Theory of Justice Rawls ’cooked the books’ in order to derive from his
hypothetical device the principles that he believed squared with our considered moral
judgments about justice’, a claim which Singer et al. believe Rawls has effectively conceded
(1995: 149). It may be the case that Rawls ‘cooked the books’, and it may further be the case
that his maximin principle is not implied by veil of ignorance reasoning. However, it does
not follow from this that no risk-averse weighted social utility function can plausibly be
supported by veil of ignorance reasoning.
12 For further discussion, see also Buchak (2013) and Broome (1990). For a discussion of the
relationship between risk-aversion and weighted social welfare functions, see Harsanyi
(1975) and Broome (1991).
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Option X Option Y Option Z
Alice 45 years (blind) - -
Beth - 60 years (blind) 35 years (full health)
TABLE 1. Rejecting Equal Value to Saving Lives (Beckstead and
Ord 2013: 234).
living 80 years with a quality of life of 0.55 and a 50% chance of living 40
years with a quality of life of 1.0; or (2) a 50% chance of living 80 years with
a quality of life of 1.0 and a 50% chance of living 40 years with a quality
of life of 0.55. Although lifetime expected well-being is maximized by
choosing the second option, it is not obvious that a rational egoist should
choose that option. If she ends up with the lower-quality life, she will also
end up with a much shorter life, because of an allocation rule that places
less value on extending her life than one of higher quality. Thus, for those
who do not already accept the use of expected utility theory for allocation
decisions, Singer et al.’s argument does not provide further reasons to
accept a simple utilitarian social welfare function.
Beckstead and Ord (2013) provide another argument for rejecting
Equal Value to Saving Lives. They invite us to imagine two otherwise
healthy 20-year-olds, Alice and Beth, who have recently contracted an
unusual disease. The disease will kill them very soon if they are not
treated, and even if treated they will be left blind or with a reduced
lifespan. We do not have enough resources to treat them both. Our
treatment options are as shown in Table 1.
After considerable research and reflection, Beth has a strong
preference for 35 years of life at full health over 60 years of life blind (for
Beth, a year of blindness therefore has a QALY score of  0.58).
No matter which option we choose, Beckstead and Ord argue, we face
a counter-intuitive conclusion. Choosing Option X exhibits a Preference for
Smaller Benefits with respect to Option Y. It seems that we should not prefer
giving Alice 45 years of blind life rather than giving Beth 60 years of blind
life (assuming blindness is equally bad for both). Y results in a Pointless
Violation of Autonomy: Beth strongly prefers Option Z to Option Y, but we
are giving her Y anyway. Z results in Disability Discrimination: if we prefer
option Z to option X, then we are choosing to give Beth 35 years sighted
rather than give Alice more years living blind. Out of these problematic
implications, Beckstead and Ord think that Disability Discrimination is the
least bad. If they are right, this gives us reason to reject Equal Value to
Saving Lives.
However, Beckstead and Ord’s conclusion is too fast. First, there
are sometimes good reasons to prefer smaller benefits when allocating
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scarce resources. As we argue in section 4, an allocative principle
that assigns greater value to a benefit the worse off the beneficiary
will sometimes endorse giving someone a smaller benefit. Other non-
maximizing allocative principles would also have this implication. Thus,
Beckstead and Ord cannot generalize from the case they describe to the
conclusion that we should always pick disability discrimination over
providing smaller benefits when faced with life-saving choices between
people with different qualities of life. Second, it is not obvious that giving
Beth the option she wants less constitutes a violation of autonomy that
the allocator of a scarce resource has a duty to respect. If we understand
violation of autonomy in a Kantian sense, this would imply that Beth has
a right to the treatment option that she prefers. This would indeed mean
that there would be something wrong with denying her this option. But
it would beg the question at issue, which is about who should be given
what. On the other hand, if all that Beckstead and Ord mean is that Beth’s
preference for Z constitutes a prima facie reason to give Beth Z, this may
be right, but it will be too weak to ground their conclusion that we should
accept disability discrimination.
If there are cases in which it is either not irrational to prefer smaller
benefits or not wrong to give someone a treatment they do not prefer,
then it does not follow that health policymakers should always accept
disability discrimination of the kind Beckstead and Ord discuss when
allocating scarce health care resources.
3.2. No Value to Reducing Morbidity
A second response to the QALY trap is to deny that curing or averting
disability has any value when lifesaving allocation decisions are being
made. Three different types of argument can be given for this. The first
maintains that disabilities do not lower quality of life. A proponent of
this view need not object to allocating lifesaving resources on the basis
of quality of life, but could nevertheless deny that disability is relevant
to doing so. The second two arguments do not deny that disabilities may
lower quality of life but deny that quality of life is relevant when allocating
lifesaving resources. The strong version holds that saving lives has lexical
priority over improving their quality. The weak version accepts value to
reducing morbidity but insists that choices concerning life-saving and life-
improving interventions are separate allocation decisions.
3.2.1. Disabilities Do Not Lower Quality of Life. The denial that disability
lowers quality-of-life may seem extraordinarily counter-intuitive. How-
ever, disability scholars have made a strong case that the quality of life
of people with physical impairments is, on average, much higher than
recognized by people without such impairments and not substantially
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lower than theirs.13 Studies of people with such disabilities suggest that
standard quality of life scores like those we have referenced in this paper
do not reflect the subjective or objective quality of life for most people
with disabilities. People have an immense capacity to adjust their goals
and desires with changing circumstances: they have an adaptability and
resilience they may not appreciate before such changes.14 Thus far we
agree with critics who argue that the quality of life scores standardly
assigned to most disabilities are far too low, and that accurate assessments
require significant input from people with the disabilities in question.
Some scholars go a step further, arguing that physical disability is a
mere-difference akin to race, sex, or sexual orientation. Notably, Elizabeth
Barnes (2009) maintains that having or acquiring a disability may be
a harm, in making life more challenging, without being a ’negative
difference-maker’ that makes life go worse overall. Life can be harder with
any stigmatized difference, especially in discriminatory environments,
but it is not appropriate to ’cure’ disability any more than it would be
to alter someone’s race, sex, or sexual orientation instead of addressing
external sources of adversity.15
However, the mere-difference claim will not get us out of the QALY
trap. First, it is much more plausible for some conditions classified as
disabilities than others; for deafness, say, than for Duchenne Muscular
Dystrophy (DMD). The former involves the mere lack of a function –
hearing; the latter, the gradual decline of motor functioning, resulting in
disruption, discomfort and early death. Given the multiplicity of ways
that people can flourish, a person biologically incapable of hearing who
lives in an inclusive environment may do as well as anyone else. Although
13 See, among others, Albrecht and Devlieger (1999) and Brazier (2005). Research also
suggests that much of the difference in self-rated quality of life between disabled and
non-disabled individuals may be due to social factors (Marinic´ and Brkljacˇic´ 2008).
14 For some evidence of this, see Ubel et al. (2005: S57). For some evidence to the contrary,
see Peeters (2012).
15 This raises the more general point about the role of non-health factors in reducing quality
of life for people with disabilities. These factors have a significant impact, but it is not
obvious how their effects should be taken into account. It is this interaction of biological
and social factors that lead John Broome (2002: 95) to question whether it is possible to
separately assess health-related quality of life: ’asthma is less bad if you are well-housed,
mental handicap is less bad in supportive communities, deafness is less bad if you have
access to the internet’. On the one hand, it seems parochial for health care allocators
to focus only on clinical measures and ignore the impact of the physical and social
environment. On the other hand, as Broome suggests, it seems perverse, even complicit,
to assign a lower quality of life estimate for a given health condition in a society with
greater disability discrimination than in a society with less discrimination. And yet, as
disability advocates would rightly insist, individuals with the same health conditions in
the two societies would probably enjoy lives of very different quality. We return to this
issue in the final sections of the paper, where we consider how people with disabilities
could be prioritized on the basis of their degree of disadvantage.
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some people with DMD can also flourish, the prospects for doing so seem
far more limited, and it is difficult to see how any plausible theory of
well-being could judge their lives to be equally good on average as those
of people without DMD. It would seem far more reasonable for a Deaf
person to refuse a ’cure’ for her condition than a person with DMD.
Moreover, as Barnes (2014) notes, acquiring (or losing) a mere
difference like a disability can involve serious loss and disruption, even if
there is nothing worse about a life with or without the disability. So even
if ’cure’ is problematic, ’prevention’ need not be. Were the mere-difference
view correct, we would still face difficult tradeoffs between saving lives
and preventing losses in quality of life. Finally, even proponents of the
mere-difference view do not make the far more radical claim that there are
no conditions or circumstances which generally lower expected quality of
life. They would have no reason to deny that the life of someone sentenced
to life without parole in a maximum security prison would probably be
worse than the life of most other people with the same life expectancy.
These last two considerations make clear that even if we accepted a mere-
difference account of disability, it would not be enough to jettison Value to
Reducing Morbidity and thereby allow us to escape the QALY trap.
3.2.2. Lexical Priority to Saving Lives. A very different reason for denying
the relevance of disabilities to the allocation of scarce health care resources
is offered by John Harris. Harris (1987, 1995) argues that we should first
spend our resources maximizing the number of lives saved, taking no
account of quality of life, and only use resources to raise people’s quality
of life if some are left over.16 He believes that this view is intuitive. But
although the notion that death is different from lesser afflictions – differing
in kind rather than degree – has some intuitive appeal, Harris’ absolutism
about the priority of life saving does not.
Though we may disagree about where the line is, most of us can
conceive of some lifesaving intervention that would be so costly that
our money would be better spent on life-improving interventions. For
example, if we must choose between extending one person’s life for just a
few days and curing a large number of people from a lifetime of chronic
pain, most people would surely favour the latter. Harris (1987: 120) admits
that there are some exceptions to the lexical priority of saving lives over
curing disease. However, even with these limited exceptions, his proposal
that we should spend nothing on improving lives until we can do no more
to save them runs into serious problems.
16 In later writing, Harris appears to take a more tentative view: ’But how does life-saving of
one now count if the alternative is life-enhancing for a much greater number later? This
cannot be finally resolved now’ (Quigley and Harris 2008). Our interest is in examining
the implications of the view Harris articulated in earlier writing.
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Suppose Harris tried to restrict the permissible trade-offs to
comparisons between life-saving interventions and very severe diseases.
Any such proposal would face the Aggregation Problem (Temkin 1996;
Broome 2004: 54). Suppose that we can either (A) prevent one person from
dying or (B) prevent two people from experiencing severe pain for the rest
of their lives. We judge that B is better than A. (If you find this judgement
implausible just increase the number of people suffering until it becomes
plausible. As long as there is some point at which you judge the trade-
off to be reasonable, the argument will go through.) Now suppose we can
either (B) prevent two people from experiencing severe pain for the rest of
their lives or (C) prevent four people from experiencing slightly less pain
for slightly less time than those in (B). C is better than B. We can continue
to produce cases, one after another, that successively prevent less and less
pain for more and more people. Eventually we arrive at Z, which is the
option to prevent a massive number of people from undergoing a small
amount of pain for a small amount of time (e.g. a headache). We judge Z
to be better than Y, Y better than X, X better than W, and so on, all the way
back to A. By transitivity of betterness, it follows that Z is better than A.
Thus, a sufficiently large number of headaches can outweigh a life.17 This
continuum argument presents a problem for Harris, who must find a non-
arbitrary point on the continuum at which he can claim that one option is
worse than the last, no matter how small the difference in suffering and
how great the difference in number of people.18
A second problem, specific to a view that accords (nearly) strict lexical
priority to life-saving interventions, concerns the definition of a life-saving
intervention. Consider a patient in an intensive care unit (ICU). During her
stay she may undergo many interventions that each qualify as life-saving,
e.g. having her heart restarted by defibrillation, having a feeding tube and
a ventilator inserted, and receiving medications, fluids and nutrition to
sustain her life. Suppose a patient received 15 meals via feeding tube,
70 hours of artificial ventilation, and eight different medications, each
necessary, during her stay in the ICU. How many life-saving interventions
did she receive? If, as Harris (1987: 120) claims, ’we should give priority
17 Several responses have been given to this challenge, but whether they succeed is
contentious. Among them are accounts by Dorsey (2009), Temkin (2012: 135) and
Voorhoeve (2014). Against them, see Norcross (1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) and Broome
(2004: 55–59).
18 Some philosophers believe that the Aggregation Problem is a premise in a sound
argument forbidding any aggregation. Harris, rejecting this view, is among the many
philosophers who believe that some limited aggregation is permissible. It is this latter
group of philosophers who have the most difficulty dealing with the Aggregation
Problem. They must draw a principled line above which certain harms have lexical
priority over any number of (even slightly) smaller harms.
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to saving as many lives as we can, not as many life-years’, we need a
plausible way of individuating life-saving interventions.
Imagine that Ahmed can be saved for 20 years with seven clinically
distinct procedures, each of which extends his life for some fraction of
that time, whereas Belin can be saved for 20 years with a single procedure,
costing the same total amount. If each clinically distinct procedure without
which Ahmed will die counts as a life-saving intervention, Harris’ model
implies that we should give treating Ahmed far higher priority than
treating Belin, even though both of them are benefiting the same amount.
On the other hand, if the seven procedures are counted as one complex
intervention, treating Ahmed should be given the same priority as treating
Belin. Harris provides no principled basis for individuation.19
3.2.3. Separate Decisions for Lifesaving and Cure. Ubel et al. (2000) propose
a more nuanced approach. Since people generally accept Equal Value
to Saving Lives, within limits, saving the lives of people with most
health conditions should be assigned the same ’societal value’ as saving
healthy lives. However, they insist that the social decision to treat most
health conditions as having no disvalue for lifesaving purposes does not
preclude assigning substantial value to their cure, since these are ’separate
decision[s]’ (Ubel et al. 2000: 897). That is, in general, we should give equal
value to saving lives and should give value to reducing morbidity, but
should not give any added value to reducing morbidity when it occurs in
the context of life-saving.
This proposal also runs into difficulties. Suppose there are three
possible treatments that we could give to a patient. Treatment A will save
their life and simultaneously raise their quality of life. Treatment B will
only save their life (for the same duration as Treatment A), and Treatment
C will only raise their quality of life (by the same degree as Treatment A)
conditional on their survival. Treatment A therefore provides the same
benefits as Treatment B and Treatment C combined. On Ubel et al.’s
proposal, we should be willing to pay the same for Treatment A and for
Treatment B, since both are lifesaving interventions and we should give no
value to the benefits of morbidity reduction that lifesaving interventions
provide. Furthermore, according to their proposal, we should be willing
to pay some amount for Treatment C, since society values raising people’s
quality of life. It follows that health policymakers, if following Ubel et al.’s
proposal, should be willing to pay more for Treatments B and C together
than for Treatment A, even though they provide exactly the same benefit
to exactly the same patient. This seems irrational.
19 This objection could be avoided were Harris to adopt an alternative view which says to
give absolute priority to life-years rather than to lives saved. However, Harris rejects such a
view (1987: 118), and the view still violates Value to Reducing Morbidity, one of the intuitive
principles that sets up the QALY trap.
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Ubel et al. could respond by arguing that giving a patient both
Treatment B and Treatment C in one hospital stay should be regarded
as giving them one compound treatment, and that we therefore should
not pay more for B plus C than for A. But if Treatment B and C are to
be considered one compound treatment, we again need an account of
the criteria for individuating interventions. Any such account appears
vulnerable to a sorites problem. We can stipulate that if we administer
two interventions 10 minutes apart they are still one intervention. But will
this remain true if we wait a week, a month, or a year to administer C after
B? If Ubel et al.’s view is to be defended, they must find a non-arbitrary
way of specifying when B and C are one compound treatment and when
they are two serial treatments, and it must be shown that it would not be
irrational to pay more in the latter case. It is difficult to believe that this
challenge can be met.
3.3. Reject Transitivity of Betterness
In section 2, we argued that one could not simultaneously defend Equal
Value to Saving Lives and Value to Reducing Morbidity while rejecting
Unequal Value for Equal Outcomes. However, Frances Kamm argues that we
can make all of these moves if we reject our assumption that the betterness
relation is transitive.
While it was once widely accepted that the transitivity of betterness
is a fundamental axiom of rational choice, recent work by Larry
Temkin (1987, 1996, 2012) has made this less obvious. Nonetheless,
transitivity of betterness does a lot of heavy lifting in CEA, so we would
need an alternative account of rational prioritization if betterness were
intransitive.
To see why intransitivity threatens rational prioritization, consider
a case Kamm discusses. We must choose between the following three
interventions:
I: Save the life of one person at full health.
II: Save the life of one unhealthy person and bring them to full health.
III: Save the life of one unhealthy person.
According to Kamm (2009: 186), and many people’s intuitive judgements,
Unequal Value for Equal Outcomes is false (I = II), there is Value to Reducing
Morbidity (II> III), and there is Equal Value to Saving Lives (III = I). But this
implies that I is as good as II is better than III is as good as I (I = II > III = I).
This intransitive betterness relationship implies that alternatives I, II and
III cannot be ordered, and so we cannot decide between them on the basis
of which is better.
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Kamm proposes that when we confront cases like this we may ’decide
on the basis of which path leads to the best outcome so long as doing so
does not hold anyone’s identity for or against him’. Choosing alternative
II rather than alternative III, she argues, leads to a better outcome without
discriminating against either patient on the basis of their identity since
both patients are unhealthy. For this reason, she asserts, we should not
choose III. But we cannot prefer II to I, Kamm thinks, because doing
so would discriminate against the patient helped by alternative I. If the
patient helped by alternative I had been unhealthy rather than healthy
before being saved and brought to full health, I and II would be equally
choiceworthy. Thus, if we were to choose II over I, we would discriminate
against the patient helped by I merely because she is not unhealthy. So,
Kamm (2009: 187) argues, when confronted with a choice between I, II and
III, we should not choose alternative III, and should give equal priority to
I and II, tossing a fair coin to decide between these two alternatives.
One could reasonably complain that Kamm’s decision procedure is
under-motivated. Why, we might ask, is it discriminatory to choose II
rather than I, while it is not discriminatory to give the patient helped
by I a chance at a treatment while giving the patient helped by III no
chance at the treatment? We do not ordinarily worry about people being
discriminated against on the basis of their being too healthy, or non-
disabled, but this seems to be Kamm’s chief worry. Kamm offers no
response to this objection, but we will not press it further.
Our chief concern is that Kamm’s proposed decision-making
procedure appears to deal with the intransitivity of betterness only by
violating the principle of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, which
is also widely regarded as a fundamental axiom of rational choice.
According to this principle, if B is not preferable to A out of the choice
set [A, B], introducing a third option that expands the choice set to [A, B,
C], must not make B preferable to A.20
To see why violating this axiom is problematic, consider the following
case:
Healthy and Unhealthy are in the emergency room. Healthy is a patient
who is normally in full health and needs Treatment X in order to survive.
Unhealthy is a patient who is normally in chronically poor health and also
needs Treatment X in order to survive. Emergency room triage staff believe
that they should treat Healthy and Unhealthy equally, and should therefore
give equal priority to saving each of their lives. Unfortunately, they can only
20 This is a simplified version of Kenneth Arrow’s (1963: 27) original formulation of the
principle. The original principle states: ’Let R1, ... , Rn and R’1, . . . , R’n be two sets of
individual orderings and let C(S) and C’(S) be the corresponding social choice functions.
If, for all individuals i and all x and y in a given environment S, xRiy if and only if xR’iy,
then C(S) and C’(S) are the same’.
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treat one patient, so they decide to toss a fair coin. Just as they are about to do
so, Needy is brought into the emergency room. Needy is just like Unhealthy,
except that the doctors could save Needy’s life and bring him to full health
afterwards if they give him treatment X. Realizing this, they send Unhealthy
away and toss a coin to decide between saving Healthy and Needy. The coin
chooses Healthy.
It seems clear that this behaviour is unreasonable, but according to
Kamm’s decision theory the physicians have acted rightly. According
to Equal Value to Saving Lives, Healthy and Unhealthy are to be treated
equally in a pairwise comparison. But if we are choosing between treating
Healthy and Unhealthy when Needy enters the room, then we must
prefer treating Healthy to treating Unhealthy. No decision theory should
have these implications for practice.21 Given this problem and the unclear
motivation for Kamm’s decision procedure, we should not go this route.
Denying the transitivity of betterness is not the right response to the QALY
trap.22
3.4. Accept Unequal Value for Equal Outcomes
Accepting Unequal Value for Equal Outcomes means giving greater value
to saving someone’s life and simultaneously bringing them to full health
than to saving the life of someone who is already at full health, even
though the outcomes of both treatments are the same. Clearly, this is a
position in need of a rationale.
One possible rationale is the Causative Principle discussed by Kamm.
According to that principle, what matters is not how much good follows
an intervention, but how much good the intervention causes. According to
Kamm, an intervention that cures disability and confers x years of perfect
health causes more good than an intervention that merely confers x years
of perfect health. Although the outcome for the individual and society are
the same, the intervention causes two gains for the disabled individual –
in health and in life – but only one for the non-disabled individual – in
life.
However, we think that this application of the causative principle is
mistaken: in fact, the two interventions cause the same amount of benefit.
If we save the life of the able-bodied person, the disabled person dies.
If we save the life of the disabled person and make her able-bodied, the
able-bodied person dies. In both cases, one patient gets healthy life and the
other patient gets death. In neither case does the disabled person continue
21 Elsewhere, Kamm (2013: 470) recognizes that her opponents argue that her view violates
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, but claims that ’such cases help show that the
principle is either incorrect or its correct interpretation does not conflict with such a result’.
22 In addition, Gustafsson (2010) has argued that any agent with acyclic, intransitive
preferences (like those endorsed by Kamm’s view) can be money-pumped.
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to live with her chronic condition. Thus, it is inappropriate to ascertain
the benefit the intervention causes by comparing it with a counterfactual
state of affairs in which someone lives with a disability. Rather, both
interventions cause the survival of one person in a healthy state. It might
be a greater achievement for health professionals if they both save a life
and restore functioning, but it is hard to see why that should be relevant
to allocation decisions.
Although Unequal Value for Equal Outcomes is prima facie implausible
and cannot be grounded in the causative principle, we do think that it
is sometimes correct. In the next section, we describe an approach to
priority-setting that explains why.
4. A MODERATE PRIORITARIAN SOLUTION TO THE QALY TRAP
Rather than simply denying Value to Reducing Morbidity, Equal Value to
Saving Lives, or the transitivity of betterness, or accepting Unequal Value
for Equal Outcomes, it is possible to hold a mixed view. According to the
mixed view we prefer, it is sometimes true that equal value should be
assigned to saving lives and it is sometimes true that we should give
unequal value to outcomes that include the same amount of well-being.
Such a view, we believe, can avoid invidious disability discrimination
without the problematic implications canvassed in section 3. However,
it must also have a principled foundation: the way it avoids the counter-
intuitive implications of the responses we have criticized should not be ad
hoc. We ground our mixed view in prioritarianism.23
Prioritarians hold that a benefit is more valuable the worse off the
recipient of the benefit. For one person to be worse off than another
he must have lower lifetime well-being.24 This might be because he is
poorer, he faces systematic discrimination, he is a widower, he has
lower life-expectancy, or he has a chronic disease or disability. In a
prioritarian scheme, patients with these kinds of welfare disadvantages
would be given some priority for treatment over patients without such
disadvantages. (Among philosophers and health policy experts, it is
highly controversial whether non-health considerations should play a role
in determining which patients are prioritized for which intervention. We
believe that all welfare considerations should, in principle, be taken into
account by health policymakers, but our prioritarian solution to the QALY
trap is compatible with the view that health care professionals should only
23 As we note at the end of this section, there are alternative principled foundations for the
mixed view we endorse. Thus one does not have to be a prioritarian at a foundational
level in order to adopt our solution to the QALY trap.
24 For an exposition of this view, see Sharp and Millum (2015).
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Treat Cecile Treat Roberto
Cecile Roberto Cecile Roberto
Pre-intervention QALYs 40 20 40 20
Post-intervention QALYs 40 0 0 20
TABLE 2. Lifetime QALY distributions.
consider health-related quality of life in determining who to prioritize for
an intervention.25)
The amount of priority given to worse-off patients depends on which
version of prioritarianism is adopted. An extreme version, leximin, states
that benefits should always be distributed to the worst-off person.26 Such
a view is implausible: it implies that trivial benefits to the worst off
person outweigh massive benefits to others who are also in great need.
We favour a moderate prioritarianism, which allocates benefits on the basis
of a combined measure of the amount of benefit provided and the degree
of disadvantage of the beneficiaries, so that a benefit is given greater
weight the more disadvantaged the beneficiary would otherwise be. The
application of moderate prioritarianism to health care priority setting is
widely endorsed by philosophers and bioethicists.27 Its relevance to the
QALY trap and the issue of disability discrimination, however, has been
comparatively neglected.
If we allocate health resources on the basis of a moderate
prioritarianism, we can simultaneously affirm Value to Reducing Morbidity
and the transitivity of betterness, give theoretical motivation for accepting
the most intuitively plausible cases of Unequal Value for Equal Outcomes,
and preserve what is most important about Equal Value to Saving Lives, all
in a principled way.
To illustrate how moderate prioritarianism preserves the moral core
of Equal Value to Saving Lives, consider a case in which we must decide
between two patients for a life-saving intervention (Table 2). Both have
lived 40 years and will die without treatment. Both, if treated, will live 40
more years. Cecile will be at full health throughout her life, while Roberto
has a congenital disease that lowers his health-related quality of life to 0.5.
For ease of presentation we use QALYs as the unit of advantage.
25 For arguments against a ’separate spheres’ approach to setting priorities for health
spending that we find compelling, see Broome (2002) and Sharp and Millum (2015: 8–10).
26 This view faces criticism from Fleurbaey et al. (2009).
27 See, among others, Ubel et al. (2000: 893–894), Brock (2006: 212–215), Kamm (2009: 156–
157) and Nord et al. (2009: S12).
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Treating Cecile produces an 80:20 distribution: Cecile gets 80 QALYs
across her life and Roberto gets 20 QALYs across his life. If we allocate
resources in a straightforwardly aggregationist way, we will treat Cecile,
since doing so will produce 40 QALYs, while treating Roberto will only
produce 20 QALYs. Treating Roberto produces a 40:40 distribution: each
patient gets a total of 40 QALYs in their life. A moderate prioritarian
is likely to judge that the second distribution is better than the first.
Although it contains less total benefit (80 instead of 100), it gives greater
priority to the worse-off patient. On a moderate prioritarianism that gives
sufficient priority to benefiting the worst-off, we should treat Roberto
even though he has a chronic disease that makes his quality of life lower
than Cecile’s. Thus, prioritarianism does not tell us to systematically
prefer saving the lives of healthy and able-bodied people over the lives
of unhealthy or disabled people.
Note, again, that moderate prioritarianism does not give absolute
priority to the worst-off. When the benefits of treating the worse off person
are sufficiently low, our scheme will sometimes tell us to save the better off
person. Suppose that in the case above Roberto’s life could only have been
extended by four years rather than 40 years. If that were the case, treating
Roberto would only produce 2 QALYs. We would therefore have to choose
between providing Cecile with an additional 40 QALYs and providing
Roberto with an additional 2 QALYs. Because moderate prioritarianism
tells policymakers to care both about a patient’s degree of disadvantage
and the amount of benefit they can provide her, a plausible moderate
prioritarianism would recommend saving Cecile rather than Roberto in
this second case.
Our proposed scheme therefore does not give categorical preference
to saving patients with high quality of life or patients with low quality
of life. Just how frequently we should prefer to save those whose usual
quality of life is low depends upon how much priority is given to treating
the worst-off. Moderate prioritarianism does not entail Equal Value to
Saving Lives. But the view does tell us not to systematically prefer saving
the lives of non-disabled people over the lives of disabled people. The
systematic preference for saving non-disabled people seems to be at the
heart of the disability discrimination objection to standard aggregation.
In some cases, our scheme would endorse Unequal Value for Equal
Outcomes. Consider the case in which we could save the life of a healthy
person or both save the life and cure the disease of an unhealthy
person. If the latter had endured this condition for some time and
so had experienced a significantly lower quality of life, she would be
worse off. We should therefore give greater priority to treating her, even
though it would provide the same benefit as treating the healthy patient.
But in situations where the patient became chronically ill only very
recently, it seems less plausible to regard her as significantly worse off.
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Our moderate prioritarianism would then tell us to treat the patients
equally.
Finally, it is easy to see why a moderate prioritarianism vindicates
Value to ReducingMorbidity and the transitivity of betterness (as a plausible
view ideally should). Because moderate prioritarianism takes all benefits
into account, it will always respond positively to a pure increase in
benefits – as in the case of morbidity reduction. And because moderate
prioritarianism can be represented by a weighted utility function, its
betterness relation is always transitive.
In addition to these reasons in favour of a moderately prioritarian
solution to the QALY trap, the view is ecumenical. The great majority of
philosophers and health economists believe that we should give higher
priority to the worst-off, although they may disagree about the details and
underlying justification.28 In addition to prioritarians, for example, there
are some philosophers who accept lifetime egalitarianism, a form of value
pluralism implying that both welfare and equality are constituent parts of
the good (Temkin 1993). In practice, lifetime egalitarianism and lifetime
prioritarianism will be virtually co-extensive for the cases regarding the
allocation of scarce resources with which we are concerned.29 Lifetime
egalitarians can therefore adopt our solution to the QALY trap. Even those
who favour a utilitarian distribution of resources can accept our model,
for the same reason that they can accept, for example, affirmative action
policies. Giving priority to the worst-off and reducing inequality in society
will almost certainly have a substantially positive effect on the far-future,
which should be of much greater concern to utilitarian philosophers than
the mere optimization of distributions in the present and near-future
(Beckstead 2013).30 Finally, those who come at resource distribution from a
28 In the words of Wolff and de-Shalit (2007: 3–4): ’[P]rovided that there are people in
a society who have not yet achieved sufficiency, and provided that we have in mind
limited, or at least finite, budgets and financial resources, then all of these views appear
to converge on the same general policy prescription in the short to medium term: identify
the worst off and take appropriate steps so that their position can be improved’ (authors’ italics).
29 Cf. Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (2016), which discusses the ways which prioritarianism and
egalitarianism come apart in population ethics. Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey do not disagree
that prioritarianism and egalitarianism are virtually co-extensive in the cases we discuss.
Since both views have the same implications, their ability to provide this solution to the
QALY trap does not provide evidence for preferring one view over the other.
30 It should be noted that Singer et al. (1995: 149–150) make this concession with respect
to the QALY trap. While it is not in principle unjust to give greater value to saving
lives that contain more well-being, they claim, what we really ought to care about is
maximizing utility, and ’there is more to overall utility than health-related QALYs’. They
write: ’It is plausible to suppose that tilting the balance of health care towards the more
disadvantaged members of society will reinforce feelings of concern and sympathy, and
lead to a more compassionate society. This in turn may be a society with more community
feeling and therefore one that provides a higher level of general welfare than a less
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liberal egalitarian angle also have reason to accept our conclusion. In prac-
tice, no policy will be sufficiently fine-grained to distinguish a prioritarian
model of resource distribution from a liberal egalitarian model that pro-
vides extra resources to those who are disadvantaged for the sake of fair
equality of opportunity. Thus, models of fair resource allocation should
converge in their insistence on both efficiency and reducing disadvantage.
Applying a moderate prioritarian view both has plausible implica-
tions for individual cases and is theoretically grounded by foundational
principles that are supposed to underlie allocation schemes outside as
well as inside the domain of priority setting for health spending. These are
powerful reasons in favour of accepting its resolution of the QALY trap.
5. OBJECTIONS
5.1. The Proposal Fails to Eliminate Disability Discrimination
Under our proposal, people with those disabilities that reduce their
quality of life will have their priority for life-saving health care resources
lowered in virtue of the lower benefits that saving their lives provides,
but raised in virtue of their being made worse off by the reduction in
their quality of life. The lives of people with disabilities would therefore
not, in general, be treated as having lesser value. The value will depend
on the extent to which their disabilities make them worse off and on the
additional weight their survival receives by virtue of their being worse
off. For the same reason, our proposal generally avoids ’double jeopardy’:
the priority assigned to worse-off individuals would mitigate rather than
compound any disadvantage arising directly from their disabilities.
Nonetheless, some might object that prioritarian ’compensation’
would only add discriminatory insult to injury by treating people with
those disabilities not as equals but as especially needy. This objection can
be met by two further considerations. First, as we argued in section 3.2.1,
quality-of-life adjustments should be based in large part on judgements
made by people who have lived with the conditions being assessed. If a
condition, such as deafness, is assessed through an inclusive process as
having only a negligible impact on quality of life, it would also receive
lower priority for prevention and ’cure’ – a consequence reflecting the
judgements of those living with the condition. If, on the other hand,
people living with a particular disability regarded their lives, on average,
as much worse because of it, saving their lives would provide them with
lower expected benefit. But they would also receive higher priority for
life-saving resources because their disability made them worse off. Thus,
compassionate society.’ Moreover, it may be ’important to act in ways that go beyond
abstract justice or fairness, instead tilting the balance so that it favours those who would
otherwise feel themselves arbitrarily disadvantaged’. See also Singer (1993: 16–54).
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our proposal would avoid or mitigate any insult in compensating people
with disabilities for their disadvantages, because it would generally
compensate them only for conditions that they themselves (or their
representatives) judged as disadvantageous.
Second, our approach is consistent with treating disabilities no
differently than other health and non-health conditions that reduce overall
quality of life. This includes not only permanent impairment and chronic
disease but also poverty, poor education, and other sources of social
inequality. Again, the reduction in expected quality of life in saving people
who experience any of these conditions could be offset by the priority
they receive for having lived with them. Our approach, in theory, treats
disabilities as just one possible source of lower quality of life; it need not
single them out for special treatment.
5.2. Double Jeopardy for the Victims of Recent Misfortune
Our approach has harsher consequences for previously well-off
individuals only recently placed in a state that lowers their quality of life.
A person who has just contracted rheumatoid arthritis (or, on a broader
approach, become divorced, or lost a child) would have lower priority for
lifesaving treatment by virtue of the reduction in her expected quality of
life going forward. But that reduction would not be offset by her status
as worse off, at least in the short term, since her quality of life has only
recently become low. Some might regard this as troublesome.31
We accept that the proposed scheme will sometimes, at least in
principle, have harsh implications for people who have been well-off until
now, but whose lives, if saved, would be lived at lower levels of well-
being. But this is an implication of any prioritarian approach that takes
the unit of concern as the individual over her whole life rather than in
her present condition. It is, in effect, no different than preferring to save
the life of a person who can be fully cured of her injuries over the life of
someone whose injuries will cause him to continue suffering terribly if he
is saved. Another, more benign implication, is that the newly better-off
will not be penalized for their recent improvement. Someone who has just
been cured of a long, painful, debilitating illness would still enjoy priority
for lifesaving resources, because their life has still been bad overall. For
the kind of moderate prioritarianism we endorse, what offsets expected
benefit is not the individual’s present condition, but their life as a whole.
5.3. Implementation Challenges
Finally, there are several challenges that might be raised regarding the
implementation of lifetime prioritarianism in helping to set priorities for
31 Singer et al. (1995: 147) also push this point.
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health care spending. First, in addition to quantifying how much health
care interventions benefit their recipients, a prioritarian must also provide
weights that quantify how much priority people with different degrees of
disadvantage should receive.32 Though, as we mentioned above, there is
widespread agreement that those who are worse off should receive some
additional priority for health care, there is not the same level of agreement
about how much priority they should receive.
This is, of course, a general problem for anyone trying to incorporate
concerns about the distribution of benefits into decision-making. Anyone
who thinks that an allocation scheme should care about more than just
maximizing total benefit must have some way of accounting for the
other considerations that matter. This is a challenge that we acknowledge,
but cannot attempt to address in this paper. It is worth noting that the
practical challenge does not appear to be insurmountable. Various tools
already exist for incorporating equity or priority concerns into CEA (Johri
and Norheim 2012: 125). The Norwegian National Committee on Priority
Setting in Health Care recently proposed a new system for deciding
which new treatments would be funded through the public health system
that explicitly attempted to capture the degree of disadvantage of the
beneficiaries of health care, in addition to the amount that they would be
expected to benefit (Ottersen et al. 2016). But even if disagreement about
the relative weights remains, it does not follow that we would be better off
adhering to standard CEA, which is the equivalent of giving no priority
to those who are worse off.
Second, lifetime prioritarianism resolves the QALY trap because of
its backwards-looking character: it is only if those who are expected
to have lower quality of life if their lives are saved have also had a
lower quality of life in the past that they get extra priority for life-saving
interventions. This might be considered problematic in two respects.33
One is that it may seem counterintuitive that someone who was ill in the
distant past should thereby gain a claim to higher priority for treatment
for an unrelated condition in the present. Why should you get treated now
just because you were ’lucky’ enough to be ill as a child? In response, note
first that it is common to think that someone’s past losses can ground a
reason to provide them with compensating benefits in the future – there
is nothing peculiar about a normative view that incorporates backwards
looking elements.34 Further, the case may seem more intuitive if we fill
in details such that the person getting priority for a benefit now was
32 We thank an anonymous reviewer for the journal for prompting us to consider this
concern.
33 We thank an anonymous reviewer for the journal for suggesting both of these concerns.
34 More complete arguments in favour of taking into account the lifetime distribution of
advantage when making allocation decisions are rehearsed elsewhere. For arguments in
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sufficiently badly off in the past to warrant it. Suppose she spent years of
her childhood wracked with a debilitating and painful illness that kept her
in and out of hospitals and prevented her from forming close relationships
with her peer group. In such a case we do not find it counterintuitive to
think that she now deserves higher priority for scarce resources.
The other way in which the backwards-looking character of lifetime
prioritarianism might be considered problematic concerns its epistemic
demands. Putting lifetime prioritarianism into practice would appear to
require investigating people’s prior quality of life. Such investigation
might seem impractical, as well as intrusive. In response, note that this
problem arises in terms of forward-looking considerations, too. As long
as the quality of life that patients experience with and without a health
intervention is considered relevant to whether that intervention should
be funded, we have to investigate what that quality of life is. Answering
the relevant empirical questions may be challenging, but it is essential to
any cost-effectiveness assessment. Whatever those challenges are, there
is no reason to think that they are greater when it comes to patients’
history, rather than their prognoses. In fact, in one respect, answering the
historical question is easier: the past has already happened. We therefore
do not suffer from as much uncertainty regarding people’s histories as
we do regarding what the effects of allocation decisions will be going
forward.
6. CONCLUSION
We have attempted to illuminate the discussion surrounding CEA
and disability discrimination by critically assessing the main ways
philosophers have responded to the QALY trap. We have argued that
their proposals all have serious problems. The prioritarian approach we
propose recognizes that a health care allocation scheme cannot ignore the
expected benefit of the resources it assigns, although that means favouring
some lives over others on the basis of expected outcome. At the same time,
it insists that expected benefit cannot be the only consideration. The past
matters as well as the future, and people who have endured poor health
or low quality of life have stronger claims to scarce resources on that
basis. Applying moderate prioritarianism in the way we have proposed
provides a principled way to allocate scarce health care resources without
discriminating against people with disabilities.
favour of lifetime prioritarianism, see Sharp and Millum (2015). For arguments in favour
of lifetime egalitarianism, see Temkin (1993: 233–240).
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